




A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES

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Authors: Peter R. Blood
Elizabeth R. Curtiss
James Heitzman
Barbara A. LePoer
Robert J. Levy
Douglas C. Makeig
Russell R. Ross


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**A SELECTIVE, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CURRENT
SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES**

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Author: Elizabeth R. Curtiss

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PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material on two current issues in South Asia:

- prospects for nuclear weapons in Pakistan, and
- tactics and organization of Afghan resistance groups.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in August 1985 and is the fifth in a series on these subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of source material.

Word processing was accomplished by Denise Winebrenner.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE NUCLEAR ENERGY
IN THE PAKISTANI CONTEXT

GLOSSARY

AEMC	Atomic Energy Minerals Center at Lahore, which is responsible for the exploration and mining of Pakistan's uranium ore, thereby filling a vital need stemming from boycotts by international nuclear fuel suppliers
CHASHNUPP	Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, a projected 900-megawatt facility in Mianwali District, Punjab. The facility was sanctioned by the Pakistani Government in 1982 to create electrical power through light-water technology.
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency (United Nations)
KANUPP	Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, a 125-megawatt reactor supplied by Canada on a turnkey basis. The facility became operational in 1972.
NPT	The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, ratified by the UN General Assembly in 1968. Pakistan considers the NPT discriminatory, but has repeatedly offered to sign if India will do so simultaneously. Islamabad voted in favor of UNGA ratification of the NPT.
PAEC	Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission
PINSTECH	Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science Technology, the site of a US-supplied 5-megawatt "swimming pool"-type reactor installed in the 1960s.

1. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PAKISTAN

"FRG Firm Gave Equipment for Bomb to Pak." News Review on South Asia (New Delhi), April 1985, p. 259.

A court case in Frieberg, West Germany, alleges that Albert Migule, the head of a local engineering firm, has illegally exported to Pakistan equipment for production of uranium hexafluoride, which can enrich uranium up to weapons grade. Migule does not deny that his firm, Ces Kalthof GmbH, delivered the apparatus to Pakistan in the late 1970s, but says the equipment itself was "only harmless technical things" which could be bought anywhere. However, the West German Government considers the act to have been a sizeable contribution to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and a violation of the NPT.

Khalid, Rasheed. "Anti-Nuclear Movement Launched." Muslim (Islamabad), 7 August 1985, p. 3.

Several organizations from the national capital area met at the Rawalpindi Press Club on 6 August to launch the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament. The group will inform the Pakistani public about the threat of nuclear destruction and will aim at keeping South Asia a nuclear free zone by opposing all efforts toward the development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the area. The meeting, which was attended by various unspecified area citizens and organizations, was addressed by Khalid Khali, Director of the United Nations Information Centre in Islamabad, who reviewed UN measures opposing nuclear proliferation.

Madukkathadom, George. "India May Go in for Nuclear Option." Financial Express (New Delhi), 14 July 1985.

If the Indian Government should decide to make nuclear weapons, it would have to produce substantially more uranium-235 than current amounts. India has enough plutonium to fuel a nuclear weapon, and analysts believe that Indian scientists are prepared for rapid fabrication of a hydrogen weapon, if a political decision to deploy were to be made. India is also working on launch technology which could deliver a nuclear weapon. The SLV-3 has placed satellites in orbit and more sophisticated successors are being built. The SLV-3 could be redesigned as an intermediate-range ballistic missile by developing control systems to guide the warheads to their targets on earth. Pakistan is believed to be far behind India in its space program, but has F-16 and Mirage-2000 aircraft, both of which are capable of carrying and releasing a nuclear weapon. Because these aircraft have limited range and could easily be intercepted, a credible Pakistani delivery system would have to rely on missiles, which Islamabad has not yet acquired.

Nuclear Energy: A Sensible Alternative. Karl O. Ott and Bernard I. Spinrad, eds. New York: Plenum Press, 1985. 382 pp.

Although this book does not dwell on the South Asian theater, it offers excellent technical chapters on the common factors in nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Several strategies for building a covert weapon are explained and evaluated. This volume will aid analysts trying to gauge

the military potential of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear energy programs.

"Pakistan's Nuclear Program." Muslim (Islamabad), 17 August 1985, p. 4.

In a "Forum" letter to Islamabad's independent daily, Dr. Abdel Qadir Khan, Pakistan's brilliant nuclear scientist, condemns a recent article in which the politically well-connected Indian columnist K. Subrahmanyam presents reasons why Islamabad might rationally move to acquire a nuclear weapon. Dr. Khan's stream of invective generally castigates Subrahmanyam's known hawkish views and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's political tutelage under his mother, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In his outrage, Dr. Khan says that "A country that exploded a nuclear bomb (we do not differentiate between a device and a bomb) 11 years ago, has a large number of unsafeguarded facilities exclusively for the use of nuclear weapons, and is almost four times as big as Pakistan Don't we remember how Gandhi and Nehru went back on solemn commitments made to us and to the international community?" Khan then reiterates Pakistan's assertions that its own nuclear program is a model of benignity and restraint. The letter, and the Subrahmanyam article which provoked it, provide an open window into two minds which drive the nonproliferation debate forward.

"Playing for Time." Statesman (Calcutta), 7 August 1985.

The article states that "though neither side may as yet be prepared to admit it officially, the focus of interest in the Indo-Pakistani negotiations has shifted from the respective merits of the two alternative treaties to New Delhi's perception of General Zia-ul-Haq's nuclear plans." The leisurely pace of recent negotiations as well as hints of flexibility on topics once thought immutable may be explained by both sides' minimizing the role of the treaties in maintaining regional peace. Both sides have reason to drag out treaty negotiations until the nuclear uncertainty is settled; New Delhi still does not have sufficient information to make a decision. While a no-war treaty between India and Pakistan would not necessarily be redundant if one or both sides developed full nuclear weapons capability, Islamabad may be inclined to formulate the draft articles of such treaty with a view to the emerging nuclear balance.

Subrahmanyam, K. "Why Pakistan Wants the Bomb." Muslim (Islamabad), 9 August 1985, p. 3.

A conservative Indian strategic columnist argues that Pakistan has numerous reasons to want nuclear weapons. Islamabad's conventional allies--China, the Arabs, and the United States--are too far from the South Asian theater to be trusted in a strictly local conflict, and relations with Iran further complicate Pakistani defense strategy. Islamabad could contain the cost of a nuclear weapon through proportional deterrence--threatening to do limited but unacceptable damage to the enemy. Regional outcaste nations like Israel and South Africa also use nuclear weapons differently than the superpowers, whose policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) requires that each side have full knowledge of the full terror the other can unleash. Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa

use the potential for nuclear weapons acquisition to imply a larger retaliatory ability than they may in fact possess. Lately the United States has also adopted this approach, which fundamentally changes the nature of deterrence and lowers the value of nonproliferation. Subrahmanyam argues that India must respond realistically and strongly to the changing nonproliferation climate brought on by the increased use of nuclear uncertainty.

2. TACTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE GROUPS

"Afghan Rebels Deploy Chinese Rockets." Jane's Defence Weekly (London), 17 August 1985, p. 295.

Since March 1985 Afghan insurgents associated with the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Gaylani group) have been deploying Chinese 107 mm high-explosive, free-flight rockets in Kunar province. Photographs accompanying the text show primitive launch techniques in which a rocket is propped in a wooden cradle, wired to a battery detonator, and aimed with a quadrant. Under normal circumstances, this rocket is fired from a 107 mm Type 63 multiple rocket launcher and has a maximum range of 8,500 meters. The warhead contains 1-25 kg of TNT and is fitted with a JIAN-1 nose-mounted fuse.

"Facing Problems But Still One of the Strongest." Afghan Information Center Bulletin (Peshawar), July 1985, p. 2.

Herat was a leading center of rebellion during the 1978 Saur Revolution, and retains its active resistance to central government, despite difficulties posed by borders with Iran and the Soviet Union and proximity to Shindand Airbase. The flat terrain characterizing most of the region is inimical to guerrilla tactics, but Herat has benefitted from strong commanders, particularly Ismael Khan and Zabiullah, who was killed in combat earlier this year. Local mujahiddin are divided into mountain groups (Pashtun-Zarghun region), urban fighters, and border units. The urban fighters have the most experience, while the border units are the most hardpressed. The three services are not coordinated. The Herat resistance also runs civilian administration in many areas. The Soviets maintain constant pressure from Shindand because Herat is the key to controlling the seven western provinces of Afghanistan. Many villages have been desolated and deserted, while only one-quarter of Herat city is under resistance control. Local mujahiddin are trying to feed abandoned cats and dogs, although their own food is scarce.

"Rebels Using Kids for Undercover Operations." Daily News (Colombo), 1 July 1985, p. 4.

A Belgian reporter who has been visiting Afghanistan reports that the use of children (chirik) against Soviet and Afghan troops is so widespread that the two armies take them into account when planning missions. Children steal arms, transmit messages, gather intelligence, and kill soldiers. One youth, who recently was killed, had blown up a jeep carrying four personnel.

"Security Tightened on Afghan-USSR Borders." Pakistan Times (Lahore), 30 July 1985, p. 12.

Soviet authorities have begun helicopter gunship patrols along the Amu River which separates the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Mujahiddin groups (affiliations unspecified) are said to be planning operations against Soviet territory. The plans allegedly originate among insurgents in Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Balakh, and Juzjun provinces.

APPENDIX

Readers seeking short, general articles enumerating and describing the major resistance groups may refer to the following:

Haqqani, Husain. "Divided, Unconquered." Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 28 February 1985, p. 36.

Martin-Roland, Michel. "Three Major Strands of Afghan Resistance." Indonesian Observer (Jakarta), 29 December 1983, p. 3.

US Congress. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hidden War: The Struggle for Afghanistan. Committee Print, 98th Congress, 2d session. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1984. 55 pp.

Sterba, James P. "Afghan Insurgents Fight Among Themselves, Too." New York Times, 2 March 1980, p. 2E.

Thapar, Karan. "Divided the Rebels Fight On." Times (London), 9 February 1982, p. 8.